Can a Seller Collect More than Expectation Damages? Yes, Says the Oregon Supreme Court

Law students learn early in their study of Contracts that an aggrieved party is entitled to collect its expectation interest.  But, is that always true?  Well, the Supreme Court of Oregon recently held that an aggrieved seller under Article 2 might be able to claim more than its expectation interest.

 

The breadth of the remedies available to a seller who has resold goods after a buyer’s breach was at issue in the case of Peace River Seed Co-Operative, Limited v. Proseeds Marketing, Incorporated.  Proseeds Marketing (“Proseeds”) was to purchase seeds from Peace River Seed Co-Operative (“Peace River”) at a fixed price over a period of two years.  During the contract period, the price of grass seeds fell dramatically and Proseeds refused to provide shipping and delivery confirmation to Peace River for the shipment of the seeds.  Therefore, Peace River cancelled the contracts and brought suit, claiming market price damages even though it had resold some of the seed.

Ultimately at issue was whether an aggrieved seller who resold goods (section 2-706) can recover the difference between the unpaid contract price and the market price, even where the market price damages would exceed resale damages actually suffered by the seller.   If Peace River could collect market price damages even where it resold the goods at a profit, it would arguably receive a windfall on the transaction.  Conversely, the court could restrict Peace River to recovery of an amount of damages no greater than it recovered in its resale.   Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that owing to the lack of clarity in the Code itself, “the text, context, and legislative history of the sellers’ remedies provisions support a seller’s right to recover either market price damages or resale price damages, even if market price damages lead to a larger recovery.”    The court reasoned that the index of remedies provided by section 2-703, coupled with the comments rejecting election of remedies, indicated that a seller could resell at a higher price and still collect a larger market-based remedy where available. 

 
Despite the decision in Peace River, a seller who attempts to claim the higher remedy under 2-708 after resale should expect a challenge from the buyer.  While the decision in Peace River is based on the Code’s rejection of an election of remedies and the “liberal” administration of remedies,  it does not necessarily follow that an aggrieved seller should be able to collect more than its expectation interest.   In such a case, it seems the seller should not have been able to obtain more than the benefit of the bargain.   One must also question whether the Court might have concluded that the resale price and market were equivalent.  But this may not be the case in a rapidly changing market.  Moreover, while the Code rejects election of remedies, it also provides that “[w]hether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts of the individual case.”   It might be argued that the pursuit of the market-based remedy when it exceeds the benefit-of-the-bargain, would entirely be the appropriate circumstance in which to bar the election of the higher remedy.

 

- JSM

Would you like some cadmium with your soft drink?

Yesterday, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), in conjunction with fast-food giant McDonald’s®, voluntarily recalled about 12 million Shrek Forever After™ collectible drinking glasses sold or awaiting sale at McDonald’s® locations throughout the U.S. after someone in Representative Jackie Speier's (D-CA) office alerted the CPSC that the movie-character illustrations on the glasses contained cadmium, prolonged exposure to which may pose a serious long-term health risk.

Millville, NJ-based Durand Glass Manufacturing Co. (DGMC), a subsidiary of Arques, France-based Arc International, manufactured the movie-themed glasses, which another Arc International subsidiary, Millville-based Arc International North America, distributed exclusively to McDonald's. McDonald's locations nationwide sold the glasses in May and early June 2010.

McDonald's web site addresses the recall through a series of FAQs (and answers). (For the benefit of those with short attention spans, every answer to which the statement would be germane includes the statement "the CPSC has said the glassware is not toxic.") Arc International deployed a press release. Representative Speier posted a statement on her web site, which also includes a link to a Los Angeles Times article about the recall. Only DreamWorks™ appears to be mum on the subject -- so far, at least. (Perhaps the Shrek-iverse's creators didn't retain all of the product licensing-rights like George Lucas did, not so long ago and not so far away, with the original Star Wars™ trilogy or they made McDonald's pay a non-refundable lump sum to market the glassware.) Rumors of a replacement glass featuring an image of McDonald's CEO Jim Skinner that transmogrifies into a Shrek-alike when filled with any non-Coca-Cola® brand soft or sport drink appear to be completely unfounded.

All fun aside, why is a commercial law blog interested in allegedly cadmium-contaminated glassware products introduced into the stream of commerce without any warning about or disclaimer regarding the possibility that they might contain an alleged carcinogen?

If this were a tort law or products liability blog, we might opine about the inevitable class-action product liability lawsuit against some combination of McDonald's, Arc International, Arc International North America, Durand Glass Manufacturing Co., the as-yet undisclosed supplier(s) of the cadmium-contaminated paint or other ingredient Durand used to commemorate Shrek™, Fiona™, Donkey™, and Puss in Boots™ (okay, Puss is probably not trademarked, given that the character's name dates from the late Seventeenth century, but we want to minimize our exposure to IP liability because most of us teach at public universities and neither we nor our employers can afford, in the current fiscal climate, to defend any infringement claim that survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion) on the glassware (and, perhaps, DreamWorks -- for making a movie about which McDonald's predicted sufficient interest that it undertook to procure the offending glassware for resale).

If this were a civil procedure blog we might weigh whether the terms and conditions (no doubt, conveniently located somewhere on the Internet) purportedly governing McDonald's sale of the collectible glassware unconscionably compel non-class arbitration (assuming facts not in evidence) in light of the Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (cert. granted May 24, 2010), about which my friend and UNLV colleague Jean Sternlight and my friend and ContractsProf Blog colleague Meredith Miller have recently blogged here and here, respectively.

If this were a consumer law blog, we might wring our hands or cluck our tongues at yet another clear example of Corporate America's crass exploitation of our children and squeeze-the-last-penny sellers who outsource production of low-priced, lower-cost consumer goods to Third World outposts like ... New Jersey. (Just kidding, Jay.)

But, again, what's the commercial law angle on collectible glassware manufactured for and sold to McDonald's for resale to McDonald's retail customers?

It should go without saying that the most interesting legal issues arising out of this scenario involve (1) what express and implied UCC Article 2 warranties each seller in the chain from DGMC (or DGMC's ingredient supplier) to McDonald's made to anyone who purchased or used the glassware; (2) to what extent, if any, each seller in that chain may have disclaimed some or all of its warranty liability, limited the remedies available to the buyer, user, or other person affected by the glassware's use, or both; (3) whether one or more warranty-making sellers breached one or more warranties to one or more buyer, user, or other person affected by the glassware's use; and (4) what remedies Article 2 affords any person to whom any seller is liable for breach of warranty.

For those wanting to add some international spice to the mix, the CBC reports here that the recall has spread to include all Canadian McDonald's restaurants. Information from the Associated Press and Reuters, reported here, indicates that recalling the glassware sent to Canadian McDonald's restaurants raises the total number of recalled glasses to 13.4 million. Both the U.S. and Canada are parties to the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). To the extent that the Canadian McDonald's restaurants purchased their Shrek Forever After™ collectible glassware from New Jersey-based DGMC or New Jersey-based Arc International North America, that transaction constituted a sale of specially-manufactured goods (CISG art. 3(1)), purchased for resale, rather than personal, family, or household use (CISG art. 2(a)), by a buyer located in one CISG "contracting state" from a seller located in a different "contracting state" (CISG art. 1(1)(a)). Therefore, unless the Canadian McDonald's buyers and New Jersey-based DGMC or New Jersey-based Arc International North America effectively opted out of the CISG (CISG art. 6), any breach of warranty claim the Canadian buyers might have (CISG art. 35), the extent to which any U.S. seller disclaimed any warranty or limited its liability for breaching any warranty (CISG arts. 6 & 35), and the available remedies (CISG arts. 45-52 & 74-78), will be matters for the CISG to resolve.

The New Math?

Q: When do 731 + 451 = 38?

A: When the subject is state enactments of Revised Article 7.

I reported earlier this month on recent state enactments of Revised Article 1 and the 2002 amendments to Articles 3 and 4. I didn't forget Revised Article 7; I was simply waiting for definitive action on bills in two states that had made their way to their respective governor's desk, but on which neither governor had yet acted.

Last Thursday (May 27) and Friday (May 28), Florida Governor Charlie Crist and Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue, respectively, signed Florida HB 731 and Georgia HB 451, making Florida and Georgia the 37th and 38th states to enact Revised Article 7. Both enactments will take effect on July 1, 2010.

Additional bills are pending in Massachusetts, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin. As of May 28, Massachusetts HB 89 and Ohio HB 490 are showing some signs of life; but Washington SB 5154 and Wisconsin AB 688 do not appear to be going anywhere in 2010.

Mississippi Makes Ten

Mississippi became the tenth state to enact the 2002 amendments to UCC Articles 3 and 4 when Governor Haley Barbour signed SB 2419* into law on April 13. SB 2419 will take effect on July 1, as will Indiana SB 501 (now Pub. L. No. 135-2009), enacted last year with a delayed effective date of July 1, 2010.


* - If SB 2419 looks familiar, it's the same bill by which Mississippi enacted Revised Article 1 -- making it a 1-3-4 bill, which is even more rare than a 1-3-4 double play!

UCC Article 1 Legislative Update

As I predicted in my last legislative update, Mississippi and Wisconsin are the 38th and 39th states to have enacted Revised Article 1.

As introduced on January 11, 2010, Mississippi SB 2419 initially included a choice-of-law provision similar to the original version of Revised § 1-301 that every enacting state has rejected and that the ALI and NCCUSL replaced in 2008. Subsequently amended to replace the introduced version of § 1-301 with language tracking the now-official version, SB 2419 passed the Mississippi Senate on February 10 and the Mississippi House on March 9, and Governor Haley Barbour signed it into law on April 13. Mississippi SB 2419, which adopts uniform Revised § 1-201(b)(20), defining good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing," takes effect on July 1.

As introduced on January 22, 2010, Wisconsin SB 472 initially included uniform Revised 1-201(b)(20), but was subsequently amended to substitute the pre-revised § 1-201(19) "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" definition in existing Wisconsin law. So amended, SB 472 passed the Wisconsin Senate on April 13 and the Wisconsin Assembly on April 22, and Governor Jim Doyle signed it into law on May 12. Wisconsin Act 320 (née SB 472) should take effect on August 1.

As of July 1, the effective date for Mississippi SB 2419 and the delayed effective date for last year's Indiana SB 501 (which I previously discussed here and here), which replaces the existing "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" good faith definition in Indiana's version of Revised Article 1 with the uniform Revised 1-201(b)(20) definition, will tilt the balance in favor or uniform Revised 1-201(b)(20) -- as opposed to retaining the pre-revised 1-201(19) definition -- to 28-10 in favor of uniform Revised 1-201(b)(20). When it takes effect on August 1, Wisconsin Act 320 will tilt the balance back slightly to 28-11 in favor of uniform Revised 1-201(b)(20).

UCC Legislative Update

It has been a fairly quiet eight months on the UCC legislative front since my last update.

Revised Article 1

As of March 1, 2010, Revised Article 1 was in effect in thirty-seven states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.

State legislatures continue to grapple with the definition of "good faith," although the uniform § R1-201(b)(20) definition has the upper hand. Of the 37 enacting states, 26 have adopted the uniform definition, while 11 have retained the pre-revised definition that, in conjunction with § 2-103(1)(b), imposes a different good faith standard on merchants and non-merchants. Effective July 1, 2010, one of those eleven minority states (Indiana) will join the majority as SB 501, enacted in 2009 primarily for the purpose of amending Articles 3 and 4, also revises Ind. Code § 26-1-1-201(19) to require all parties to act honestly and to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. (At present, Indiana's Revised Article 1 requires only “honesty in fact.”) This change will take effect July 1, 2010, and further tip the balance among enacting states in favor of the unitary good faith definition in uniform R1-201(b)(20).

With many state legislatures occupied with more pressing issues of the moment, 2009 yielded only three new adoptions -- Alaska, Maine, and Oregon -- down from five in 2008, and seven in 2007. While a downward trend in new enactments eventually becomes inevitable once two-thirds of the states have signed on, 2009's three enactments were the fewest in a year since 2003 (when Idaho became the third state overall to enact Revised Article 1).

As of March 1, only two states -- Mississippi and Wisconsin -- appear to be serious candidates to enact Revised Article 1 in 2010.

Mississippi SB 2419, introduced and amended (to replace a choice-of-law provision that appeared to have derived from the original § R1-301 that all 37 enacting states have declined to adopt and the ALI and NCCUSL have disavowed with one that reflected the substitute § R1-301 the ALI and NCCUSL promulgated in 2008) in January, unanimously passed the Mississippi Senate on February 10. It is presently before the House Judiciary Committee.

Wisconsin AB 687, introduced on January 25 and amended on February 16 to replace the uniform R1-201(b)(20) "good faith" definition with the pre-revised 1-201(19) version, received the Assembly Committee on Financial Institutions's unanimous approval on February 26. It is presently before the Assembly Rules Committee.

Two other bills, Massachusetts HB 89 and Washington SB 5155, seem less likely to produce results.

Massachusetts HB 89, the fifth attempt to enact Revised Article 1 in the Commonwealth, was assigned to the Joint Committee on Economic Development and Emerging Technologies on January 20, 2009. No further action had been reported as of March 1, 2010.

Washington SB 5155, introduced on January 15, 2009, appeared to be drawn directly from the language of official Revised Article 1 circa 2001, including the original version of § R1-301. At an initial public hearing on January 23, 2009, all those testifying in support of and in opposition to the bill opposed the choice-of-law provision. The Washington Senate appears to have taken no further action except to "reintroduce and retain [the bill] in present status" on January 11, 2010.


Article 2 and 2A Amendments

As of March 1, 2010, only three state legislatures (Kansas, Nevada, and Oklahoma) have considered bills proposing to enact the 2003 amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A. The Kansas and Nevada bills died on the vine.

In 2005, Oklahoma amended Sections 2-105 and 2A-103 of its Commercial Code to add that the definition of “goods” for purposes of Articles 2 and 2A, respectively, “does not include information,” see 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-105(1) & 2A-103(1)(h) (West 2009), and amended its Section 2-106 to add that “contract for sale” for purposes of Article 2 “does not include a license of information,” see id. § 2-106(1). The net effect is similar to having enacted Amended §§ 2-103(k) & 2A-103(1)(n), both of which exclude information from the meaning of “goods” for purposes of Article 2 and 2A, respectively. Otherwise, no state has enacted any of the 2003 amendments.

While the list of states enacting any of the 2003 amendments may not change in the near future, the number of amendments Oklahoma enacts may. Introduced on February 1, 2010, Oklahoma HB 3104 proposes amendments to forty-nine sections of Article 2 and four sections of Article 2A. The bill includes neither the reformulation of Sections 2-206 and 2-207 nor the addition of Sections 2-313A and 2-313B included in the 2003 Article 2 amendments. Many of the amendments appear designed to facilitate electronic signatures and transactions and to accommodate the terminology surrounding them that grows out of UETA, E-SIGN, and Revised UCC Articles 1 and 7, or to otherwise align Article 2 and 2A terminology with that used in Revised Articles 1 and 7. That is not to say that HB 3104 proposes only cosmetic changes to Oklahoma's versions of Articles 2 and 2A. Several of the proposed amendments alter existing substantive rights, obligations, or remedies. Some of those alterations (e.g., raising the § 2-201 floor from $500 to $5,000) do not seem to be inherently controversial; some (e.g., granting/recognizing a right to cure after a justifiable revocation) may or may not be controversial depending on how courts have interpreted the current Article 2; and some (e.g., giving sellers the right to recover consequential damages) do seem inherently controversial. More on this if the bill progresses.


Article 3 and 4 Amendments

As of March 1, 2010, the 2002 amendments to Articles 3 and 4 were in effect in eight states: Arkansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma (for a second time), South Carolina, and Texas. They will take effect in Indiana on July 1, 2010.

As of March 1, 2010, the only pending Articles 3 and 4 bill is Massachusetts HB 90, which has been languishing for more than a year.


Revised Article 7

As of March 1, 2010, Revised UCC Article 7 was in effect in thirty-six states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.

Additional bills are currently pending in Georgia, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin; but only the Wisconsin bill appears to be making any progress.

First introduced on February 18, 2009, Georgia HB 451 won unanimous approval in the Georgia House on March 12, and the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended passage on March 26. However, the legislature adjourned on April 3 without a third reading and final action in the senate. HB 451 was "recommitted" to the Georgia Senate on January 11, 2010. No further action has been reported.

Massachusetts HB 89, which also proposes adopting Revised Article 1, was assigned to the Joint Committee on Economic Development and Emerging Technologies on January 20, 2009. No further action has been reported.

Washington SB 5154 was introduced on January 15, 2009, scheduled for a public hearing on January 23, 2009, and then stalled, like its Revised Article 1 counterpart, but without as compelling a reason. It was "reintroduced and retained in present status" on January 11, 2010. No further action has been reported.

Wisconsin AB 688 was introduced on January 25, 2010. On February 22, the Assembly Committee on Jobs, the Economy and Small Business unanimously recommended passage. The bill is now before the Assembly Rules Committee.

Call for Papers: February 2010 Contracts Conference at UNLV

UNLV's William S. Boyd School of Law will host a two-day conference, February 26 & 27, 2010, designed to afford scholars and teachers at all experience levels (including those preparing to enter the academy and those whose primary teaching appointment is not in a law school) an opportunity to present/demonstrate and discuss (formally and informally) recently-published and accepted-but-not-yet-published scholarship, works-in-progress, as-yet-fully-formed ideas for scholarship, and pedagogical innovations, and to network with colleagues -- and potential collaborators or mentors -- from around the country and the rest of the (predominantly) common-law world.

Invitation: We invite paper, presentation, and panel proposals exploring any aspect of contract law, theory, and policy writ large (including, but not limited to, bankruptcy/insolvency, commercial law, consumer law, dispute resolution regimes, family law, insurance law, legal systems, and restitution, in addition to more traditional contract topics) from a behavioral, comparative, critical, doctrinal, economic, empirical, equitable, historical, institutional, interdisciplinary, jurisprudential, pedagogical, philosophical, policy-driven, or political perspective. We also solicit volunteers to serve as moderators or discussants for panels that are not "packaged deals."

The CFPs issued earlier this year for the AALS Section on Contracts' January annual meeting program on New Approaches to Teaching Contracts: A "Teach-In" and the AALS Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law's January annual meeting program on The Principles of the Law of Software Contracts: A Phoenix Rising from the Ashes of Article 2B and UCITA? each yielded more excellent proposals than either section could accommodate in New Orleans. Both topics remain quite relevant, and I hope to assemble one or more panels on each that will continue the conversations begun in New Orleans. I am also working on the opening plenary, my UNLV colleague Jeff Stempel is organizing a panel on insurance contracts, and Wayne Barnes (Texas Wesleyan) is organizing a panel on comparative contract law and theory. Those efforts, if all bear fruit, still leave room for many more presenters, moderators, and discussants.

We will try to accommodate as many presenters, moderators, and discussants as possible. We particularly encourage junior scholars and those who work in non-U.S. legal systems to propose papers or panels and to volunteer to serve as a discussant or moderator. We also welcome anyone who wishes to attend the conference without presenting or serving as a discussant or moderator. The educational and networking benefits alone are worth the price of admission.

Publication: There is no publication requirement for conference participants, although experience suggests that individual papers and panels often find good homes. The Nevada Law Journal encourages participants to submit individual and panel papers and hopes to publish several works from the conference in upcoming issues.

Likely Attendees: In addition to me, Jeff Stempel, and Wayne Barnes (mentioned above), as of November 18, the following have committed to attend, or expressed a strong desire to attend: Eniola Akindemowo (Thomas Jefferson), Roy Anderson (SMU), Wayne Barnes, Dan Barnhizer (Michigan State), Charles Calleros (Arizona State), Hazel Glenn Beh (Hawaii), Barbara Bucholtz (Tulsa), Gerald Caplan (McGeorge), Miriam Cherry (McGeorge), Carol Chomsky (Minnesota), Karen Cross (John Marshall), Sidney DeLong (Seattle), Larry DiMatteo (Florida, Warrington College of Business), Jay Feinman (Rutgers-Camden), Marjorie Florestal (McGeorge), David A. Friedman (Willamette), Larry Garvin (Ohio State), Danielle Kie Hart (Southwestern), Nicholas Johnson (Fordham), Yong-Sung Jonathan Kang (U. of Washington), Tadas Klimas (Lithuania), Chuck Knapp (UC-Hastings), George Kuney (Tennessee), Peter Linzer (Houston), Charles Martin (Florida Coastal), Jennifer Martin (Oregon), Meredith Miller (Touro), Marcy Peek (Whittier), Joe Perillo (Fordham), Deborah Post (Touro), Michael Pratt (Queen's University/Ontario), Cheryl Preston (BYU), Scott Pryor (Regent), Val Ricks (South Texas), Caprice Roberts (West Virginia), Irma Russell (Tulsa), Adam Scales (Washington & Lee), Andrew Schwartz (Colorado), Sean Scott (Loyola-L.A.), Jeff Stempel, Otto Stockmeyer (Cooley), Howard Walthall (Cumberland), Jarrod Wong (Pacific), and Debbie Zalesne (CUNY). All this without a proper CFP until now. I expect attendance will be at least double this number.

Submitting a Proposal: If you would like to propose a presentation or panel, please e-mail a title, brief description, and any supporting materials by January 4, 2010 to keith.rowley@unlv.edu or snail-mail it to me at 4505 S. Maryland Pkwy., Box 451003, Las Vegas, NV 89154-1003. If you would like to discuss or moderate, please let me know your interests and availability by January 4. We will evaluate proposals as they come in and will consider on a space-available basis any we receive after January 4.

Preliminary Schedule: The conference program will begin both Friday and Saturday morning no later than 9:00 a.m. (grazing and conversational opportunities will start earlier) and will run until 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. each day.

Accommodations: The Hyatt Place next to campus (4520 Paradise Road, Las Vegas, NV 89169) is holding a block of rooms at the rate of $118.00 per night (plus tax). The official deadline for hotel registration at the conference rate is January 25, 2010. However, I encourage you to book sooner, as we blocked a limited number of rooms (due to the The Hyatt Place requiring the law school to guarantee at least 80% occupancy and pay the difference if actual registration was less than we anticipate) and will be more likely to get the Hyatt Place to make the conference rate available to additional attendees if early registration is robust.

To book a conference-rate room at The Hyatt Place, go to http://www.lasvegas.place.hyatt.com/; choose a check-in date no earlier than February 25, 2010 and a check-out date no later than February 28, 2010; enter group code G-BOYD for Boyd School of Law Contracts Conference in the box labeled Group/Corporate #; hit the check availability button; if a room is available, verify that your group name is specified next to rate details and if everything matches, then hit book. If you have trouble booking online, or if you prefer to reserve a room over the phone, please call the hotel at (702) 369-3366.

Transportation: For attendees who stay at the conference hotel, The Hyatt Place provides airport shuttle service and we'll provide transportation between the Hyatt Place and the law school for those not wanting to walk the mile or so. Attendees who prefer to stay on The Strip or elsewhere are responsible for their own transportation.

Sustenance: Your registration fee will cover the costs of lunches both days and a reception and dinner Friday evening, as well as coffee, fruit, and baked goods each morning and cold beverage service and morsels each afternoon. The Hyatt Place also offers a complimentary continental breakfast, which might be particularly attractive to those whose body clocks are on Eastern or Central Time.

Registration: We're still finalizing the conference registration fee and process. The registration fee will be no more than $250. This is higher than past spring contracts conferences. Fortunately, the lower conference hotel rate than at prior conferences, free airport transportation for those staying at the conference hotel, and the relative ease and low cost of flying into and out of Las Vegas's McCarran Airport (which is less than two miles from the hotel) compared to the last three venues, will offset the higher registration fee.

Mark Roark on Fixtures

Commercial Law's Mark Roark (LaVerne) has written Defining Fixtures in Law and Policy in the UCC, which will appear in the Cincinnati Law Review. It always warms my heart to see great law review placements on UCC papers! Here's the abstract:

This article offers both a concession and a critique. The article concedes that the law of fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code is helplessly tied to the various state laws dictating real estate. The natural impact of explicitly tying a UCC doctrine to multiple state law variation is the automatic loss of uniformity. At the center of the fixtures discussion in the UCC is a definition that does not define, and more importantly, does not limit doctrinal extension. Because the UCC offers a non-defining definition, this article considers the function of the fixtures definition. Specifically, the article looks to the original drafters comments about what the purpose of the fixtures definition was intended to accomplish.

Conceding that the definition in the UCC does not define, the article then critiques the definition by asking what role the definition plays in the game of seeking uniformity. Specifically, the article argues that the fixtures definition in UCC Section 9-102(a)(41) performs a function just as important as defining - it narrates. The article argues that the drafters in deciding on a definition of fixtures isolated themes of commonality and described those themes in a concise, but useful description of the fixture. Those themes include the joining of goods to realty, the concept of relation, and the emphasis on interests as a governing factor in the fixtures analysis. The article argues that the narration accomplished by the UCC allows for uniformity, not by mandatory uniformity, but by synchronic dialogue - allowing the themes to create images and the images to compel instinctive beliefs. The article argues, however, that the description provided by the drafters should be reunited with the substantive provisions relating to fixtures since each are tied to the other’s understanding.

-JSM

Mid-Year Legislative Update

With most state legislatures having concluded their business for the year, here is the 2009 mid-year legislative update.

Revised Article 1

As of January 1, 2009, Revised Article 1 was in effect in thirty-four states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.

Notwithstanding my suggestion elsewhere that the promulgation of a substitute § R1-301 might “grease the skids” for additional enactments, 2009 has turned out to be a relatively quiet legislative year for Revised Article 1, with only three enactments – down from five in 2008, and seven in 2007. While the most noteworthy nonuniformity among the thirty-seven enactments remains the definition of “good faith” – with 26 states having adopted the uniform § R1-201(b)(20) definition and 11 having retained the pre-revised definition that imposes a different good faith standard on merchants and non-merchants – all three 2009 enactments adopt the uniform definition and one of the eleven states (Indiana) that retained the pre-revised definition has amended its version of Revised Article 1 to adopt the uniform definition effective July 1, 2010.

As of June 26, Alaska (HB 102), Maine (LD 1403), and Oregon (SB 558) have enacted Revised Article 1 thus far this year. The Alaska and Oregon enactments take effect on January 1, 2010, with Maine’s following on February 15, 2010.

The Washington legislature failed to act on SB 5155 before adjourning sine die on April 26. (That’s probably just as well, because the introduced version of SB 5155 appeared to be drawn directly from the language of official Revised Article 1 circa 2001 and included the no-longer-official version of Revised 1-301 that all 37 enacting states have declined to adopt).

It is possible that the Massachusetts legislature will consider a Revised Article 1 bill sometime this year; however, having waited months for HD 89 to be assigned a bill number, and given the failure of four prior bills to garner a floor vote in either chamber, I would be surprised to see definitive action anytime soon.

Article 2 and 2A Amendments

As of June 26, 2009, only three state legislatures (Kansas, Nevada, and Oklahoma) had considered bills proposing to enact the 2003 amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A. In 2005, Oklahoma amended Sections 2-105 and 2A-103 of its Commercial Code to add that the definition of “goods” for purposes of Articles 2 and 2A, respectively, “does not include information,” see 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-105(1) & 2A-103(1)(h) (West Supp. 2008), and amended its Section 2-106 to add that “contract for sale” for purposes of Article 2 “does not include a license of information,” see id. § 2-106(1). The net effect is similar to having enacted Amended §§ 2-103(k) & 2A-103(1)(n), both of which exclude information from the meaning of “goods” for purposes of Article 2 and 2A, respectively. Otherwise, no state has enacted the 2003 amendments.

Article 3 and 4 Amendments

As of January 1, 2009, the 2002 amendments to Articles 3 and 4 were in effect in six states: Arkansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, South Carolina, and Texas. However, by July 1, 2010, that number will increase by at least 50%.

As of June 26, Indiana (SB 501), New Mexico (SB 74), and Oklahoma (SB 991) have enacted the 2002 amendments to Articles 3 and 4 thus far this year. Oklahoma SB 991 will take effect on November 1, 2009; New Mexico SB 74 will take effect on January 1, 2010; and Indiana SB 501 will take effect on July 1, 2010.

In addition to enacting the 2002 amendments to Articles 3 and 4 and the usual conforming amendments, Indiana SB 501 also revises the definition of “good faith” in Ind. Code § 26-1-1-201(19) – Indiana’s counterpart to UCC § 1-201(b)(20) – to require all parties to act honestly and to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. At present, Ind. Code § 26-1-1-201(19) requires only “honesty in fact.”

Revised Article 7

As of January 1, 2009, Revised UCC Article 7 was in effect in thirty-one states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. As of July 1, Revised Article 7 will be in effect in South Dakota, as well.

This has been a relatively active legislative year for Revised Article 7. In addition to South Dakota SB 89, which will be in effect by the time you read this, Alaska (HB 102), Maine (LD 1405), and Oregon (SB 558) have already enacted Revised Article 7 in 2009, and Louisiana HB 403 lacks only Governor Bobby Jindal's signature (or pocket veto). Alaska HB 102 and Oregon SB 558 will take effect on January 1, 2010, as will Louisiana HB 403 (if enacted). Maine LD 1405 will take effect on February 15, 2010.

Georgia HB 451 made significant progress toward adoption. First introduced on February 18, the Georgia House unanimously passed the House Judiciary Committee’s substitute version on March 12, and the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended passage on March 26. However, the legislature adjourned on April 3 without a third reading and final action in the senate.

Washington SB 5154 stalled, like its Revised Article 1 counterpart, but without as compelling a reason.

UETA

While the Georgia legislature did not pass HB 451 prior to adjourning, it did pass the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (HB 126), to which Governor Sonny Perdue affixed his signature on May 5. As a result, effective July 1, 2009, Illinois, New York, and Washington will be the only states in which UETA is not in effect.

Oops!

Law.com reports that Bank of America and Citibank stand to lose in excess of $51 million because Bank of America, acting on its own behalf and as Citibank's agent, terminated both banks' financing statements against the former law firm of Heller Ehrman in August 2007, some 14 months before Heller Ehrman filed bankruptcy. As we all know, UCC § 9-317(a)(2) and 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), collectively, generally give a bankruptcy trustee (or a debtor-in-possession) priority over any security interests that were unperfected when the debtor filed bankruptcy. That's bad enough news for Bank of America's and Citibank's apparently unperfected-at-filing security interests. (Bank of America and Citibank have argued that an October 2008 "correction" revived their perfection well before Heller Ehrman filed bankruptcy and had the effect of making the banks perfected when Heller Ehrman paid them. Heller Ehrman counters that the "correction" did not cure the banks' lapse in perfection.)

But, wait, it appears to get worse. Less than 90 days before Heller Ehrman filed bankruptcy, and well after Bank of America terminated its and Citibank's filings, Heller Ehrman paid the banks $51 million of the firm's outstanding debt. Under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), the payment looks like an avoidable preference, which the banks may have to refund to the bankruptcy estate.

With Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman on one side and Greenberg Traurig on the other, this dispute figures to be hotly contested and should be interesting to follow.

(Hat tip to Scott Burnham.)

AALS Workshop on Transactional Law

You may want to mark your calendars for next June's AALS Workshop on Transactional Law, June 10-12, in scenic Long Beach, California. If you go, keep your eyes open for flying buses and '67 Shelby GTs. (Both scenes are set in or entering Long Beach; and yes, the dialogue in the second one is in Espanol.) The workshop is part of the AALS Mid-Year Meeting. Program details are not yet available on the AALS web site. However, the November AALS News provides the following description, as well as a list of topic and speakers and registration information that you can access by clicking this link.

“Transactional law” refers to the various substantive legal rules that influence or constrain planning, negotiating, and document drafting in connection with business transactions, as well as the “law of the deal” (i.e., the negotiated contracts) produced by the parties to those transactions. Traditionally, the law school curriculum has emphasized litigation over transactional law. However, many modern lawyers serve corporate clients, and a significant percentage of lawyers engage in some form of transactional practice. Hence, law schools must place greater emphasis on training law students to be transactional lawyers, and should support law faculty engaged in scholarship focused on transactional law. To this end, in 1994, the AALS held a workshop on the transactional approach to law, which sparked experimentation and innovation in teaching and scholarship related to transactional law. Since that time, there have been significant developments in transactional law. This Workshop not only will take stock of those developments, but also will enable participants to gain some in-depth perspective regarding the relative benefits and drawbacks of those developments.

Law schools have attempted to respond to the demand for increased transactional training in a variety of ways, from integrating transactional law into traditional law school courses to developing stand alone “Deals” or “Business Planning” courses. A number of law schools have developed innovative programs in transactional law. This Workshop will enable participants to discuss specific methods of teaching transactional skills with an eye towards ferreting out best practices. Should professors interested in teaching transactional law focus on substantive law, “transactional skills,” (i.e., planning, negotiating, and drafting), economic or other theories of business transactions, or all of the above? Should transactional skills be taught in separate courses or integrated into substantive courses? If taught in separate courses, should such courses be part of the first-year curriculum, integrated throughout the three years, or focused on the upper-level curriculum? How do you modify or supplement the traditional case method to teach students useful transactional skills? The Workshop also will explore the challenges and benefits that arise for those who write or would like to write transactional scholarship. And as initial matter, the Workshop will address how best to define “transactional scholarship” in a way that accurately captures the potential breadth and depth of transactional law, and how transactional scholarship differs from traditional legal scholarship.

The Workshop also will explore best practices for writing scholarship in this area, including methodologies for researching the legal, financial and practical effects of various corporate transactions. The Workshop will feature concurrent works-in-progress sessions, enabling participants to exchange ideas and insights regarding new scholarship related to transactional law.

One important goal of the Workshop is to bring together faculty from different doctrinal areas of law, including faculty who teach in the clinical setting. Transactional law touches many substantive areas of law, and it is closely identified with bankruptcy, business associations, contracts, commercial law, intellectual property, labor and employment law, securities regulation, and taxation. The Workshop will provide a unique opportunity for faculty members to make connections between their primary fields and transactional law, and thus should appeal to a broad spectrum of scholars and teachers.

Dick Speidel Tribute at AALS Annual Meeting

Northwestern University School of Law and the University of San Diego School of Law are hosting a reception at the AALS Annual Meeting in San Diego on Friday, January 9, from 6:30 to 8:30 p.m. in the Warner Center Room, 4th floor, south tower of the San Diego Marriott Hotel & Marina, honoring the career of Richard Speidel, who passed away this past semester. Dick was a major figure in contracts, commercial law, and international arbitration.

A short program, featuring remarks by Professors Jim White (Michigan) and Bob Summers (Cornell), Dick's long-time collaborators, and Deans Kevin Cole (San Diego) and David Van Zandt (Northwestern), will begin at 7:00 p.m. The organizers will also videotape remarks from those who knew Dick or his work and will provide a copy to Dick's family.

Bailments

A post on teaching bailments as an aspect of agricultural law appears on the Agricultural Law Blog, here.

Doctrinal UCC Scholarship: A Guilty Pleasure

I would like to thank Jennifer Martin for inviting me to guest blog here at Commercial Law. As Jason and Jennifer's entries mention, I have been spending a bit of my research time in the last few years on a comprehensive review of the fraud cases decided under revised Articles 3 and 4. It is a bit insane to be doing commercial paper doctrine in the waning days of the check, but--to report back--it has been a tremendous amount of fun. Although it sometimes seems as if doctrinal scholarship is the current bete noire of legal scholarship, I found the experience of wading through 100s of fraud cases to be analytically rigorous, challenging, and rewarding. Writing in a style that includes judges and lawyers as part of the discussion takes a certain amount of craftsmanship. The doctrinal project also has produced huge dividends in teaching the UCC and, in my experience, has significantly informed and even changed my prior views about the UCC fraud loss provisions.

Without meaning at all to impugn theory or empiricism, it is wildly fun to take a long, close look at the Code in action.

Favorite Commercial Law Scholarship

I've been meaning for some time to post on my favorite commercial law writings (domestic and modern, as opposed to comparative and historical, about which I've blogged already). By wonderful coincidence, the author of one of my favorite pieces is joining us as a guest blogger! So as a second welcome to Brooke, I give a "strong buy" recommendation to her article, "Check Fraud in the Courts After the Revision to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4." This great piece offers one of the most lucid and engaging discussions available of the development and current state of fraud loss-allocating rules.

What is/are others' favorite contribution(s) to commercial law scholarship?

The One Thing Markets Hate Worse Than Losses?

The last two days offer a vivid illustration of the raison d'être of the UCC (and commercial law generally). The one thing that markets hate worse than losses is . . . uncertainty.

The Dow has risen 779 points--over 7%--over the past two days (really, the past day-and-a-half), with financial stocks enjoying impressive gains (from the CNN story: "Merrill rose 28%, Bank of America gained 17%, AIG rose 51%, Morgan rose 25%, Goldman rose 20% and WaMu rose 28%."). All this on news that these very financial companies are going to be allowed to sell their worst assets to a newly created federal entity at a huge loss. Wait, can that be right? Hooray for losses???

The CNN story quotes one financial expert as saying that "the fundmentals have changed and that's going to support markets going forward." What fundamentals could this odd loss-accelerating proposal implicate?

Well, the most important fundamental, apparently: certainty, or at least the lack of obvious uncertainty. On Wednesday, the bailout of AIG created not certainty that the end of this crisis was nigh, but fears about which financial giant would be next on the Fed's discount shopping spree through Wall Street. No one knew who would be the next victim of uncertainty with respect to the value of the mortgages and mortage-backed securities at the heart of this problem. Beginning with rumors yesterday and confirmed today, the market finally started to glimpse the light at the end of the tunnel. If we have to run over hot coals barefooted to get to that light, so be it, but just tell us when we've hit rock bottom! Though the details remain shrouded in secrecy, the thrust of the plan is to drill down to bedrock by goosing some sort of market mechanism that will force banks and investors to admit once and for all how depressed the value of their mortgage-related assets really is (i.e., auctions to see who can offer these toxic assets to the Feds for the lowest price--I'll sell for 50% face value; no I'll sell for 40% . . . what a spectacle that will be!). Once the culprits of the housing crisis are forced to eat crow and turn over these assets, one hopes the feds will follow the FDIC-IndyMac example and start responsibly writing down the principle on overvalued mortgages, keeping people in their homes, and stopping the downward spiral in home prices. The end is near . . . . ?

O.K., O.K., another fundamental is involved here, too, I guess: liquidity. A Fed purchase of these uncertain payment streams will result in a huge infusion of liquidity into the market, having the double benefit of easing fears about the value of the assets and dousing loan markets with the cash that they have so desperately needed to get back to financing business and consumption on reasonable loan terms. That being said, my sense is that the infusion of certainty is much more central to this recovery (one hopes, long-term) than the expected infusion of liquidity.

It's hard for us to offer ready examples to students of why the certainty of HIDC status or Article 9 so facilitated the growth of commerce in the olden days, so let's point out the amazing effects of the promised exorcism of uncertainty this week.

UCC Legislative Update

Nearly three months after both houses of the Illinois legislature passed SB 2080, Governor Rod Blagojevich signed it into law on August 22, making Illinois the 34th state to enact Revised UCC Article 1 and the 31st state to enact Revised UCC Article 7.

As have all thirty-three prior state enactments, and consistent with the ALI's and NCCUSL's promulgation earlier this year of a substitute for the original version of uniform R1-301, Illinois Public Act 95-0895 (neé SB 2080) rejects the 2001 uniform version of R1-301 in favor of language generally tracking its version of pre-revised 1-105. Act 95-0895 also rejects the uniform good faith definition in R1-201(b)(20), joining Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia in opting to retain the bifurcated good faith standard of pre-revised 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).

Act 95-0895 will take effect January 1, 2009.

In Memoriam: Richard E. Speidel (1933-2008)

The fields of contracts and commercial law (as well as ADR) lost an important scholar and a wonderful gentleman Saturday. At the time of his death, Dick Speidel was the Beatrice Kuhn Professor Emeritus at Northwestern University School of Law and a half-time professor at the University of San Diego School of Law. A longtime collaborator of James J. White and Robert Summers, with whose UCC hornbook and treatise I assume all our readers are familiar, Dick served from 1991-1999 as reporter for Revised UCC Article 2 — an experience he recounted in Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607 (2001). Among his many other books and articles are Studies in Contract Law (7th ed. 2008), which he co-authored with Ian Ayres (and previously with the late Edward J. Murphy), Commercial Transactions: Sales, Leases, and Licenses (2d ed. 2004), which he co-authored with Linda J. Rusch (who served from 1996-1999 as associate reporter for Revised Article 2).

USD Law Dean Kevin Cole posted this brief tribute.

Waiting for SB 2080

Both chambers of the Illinois legislature passed SB 2080 on May 31, 2008. Taking advantage of most of the 30 days the Illinois Constitution affords the legislature to present a passed bill to the governor, see Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9(a), SB 2080 was sent to Governor Rod Blagojevich on June 27, 2008. As of July 30, 2008, Governor Blagojevich has neither signed nor vetoed SB 2080. If this were legislation Congress forwarded to President Bush or that most state legislatures forwarded to their respective governors, SB 2080 would by now be deemed enacted by passage of time. However, the Illinois Constitution affords the governor 60 days to sign or veto a bill before it is deemed enacted without the governor's action. See Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9(b). So, while the bills enacting Revised Article 1 in Pennsylvania (also enacting Revised Article 7), South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont this year have all taken effect since the Illinois General Assembly passed SB 2080, Illinois's incipient enactment of Revised Articles 1 and 7 continues to idle. (Hopefully, unlike Godot, SB 2080 will eventually arrive.)

If enacted, SB 2080 will make Illinois the thirty-fourth state to have enacted Revised Article 1 and the thirty-first state to have enacted Revised Article 7.

Ding, Dong, the Which* is Dead

At its annual meeting last week, the American Law Institute approved an amendment, which NCCUSL (a.k.a. the Uniform Law Commission) had previously approved, replacing the oft-jilted text of Revised UCC § 1-301 with language consistent with pre-Revised UCC § 1-105:

§ 1-301. Territorial Applicability; Parties’ Power to Choose Applicable Law.
  (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.
  (b) In the absence of an agreement effective under subsection (a), and except as provided in subsection (c), [the Uniform Commercial Code] applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
  (c) If one of the following provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law so specified:
    (1) Section 2-402;
    (2) Sections 2A-105 and 2A-106;
    (3) Section 4-102;
    (4) Section 4A-507;
    (5) Section 5-116;
    [(6) Section 6-103;]
    (7) Section 8-110;
    (8) Sections 9-301 through 9-307.

In so doing, the bodies responsible for the Uniform Commercial Code followed the lead of thirty-two of the thirty-three states that have enacted Revised Article 1 to date. Only Louisiana — deferring to its Civil Code to ascertain the applicable law where the transaction does not fall within the scope of a more specific choice-of-law provision elsewhere in the UCC — has enacted a version of Revised § 1-301 that differs non-trivially from the new official version.

* - As in, "Which state's law do you want to govern our contract?"